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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE MEANING OF INTERROGATION UNDER
,MIRANDA
Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
The Supreme Court recently established a new
test for determining whether law enforcement of-
ficers have interrogated a suspect in custody after
he has asserted his Miranda' rights. 2 In Rhode Island
v. Innis,3 the Court held that statements which
police officers knew or should have known were
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect constitute interrogation. Applying the test
to the facts of the case, the majority found that
police did not interrogate Innis and therefore had
not violated his Miranda rights.
4
The Court's new test focuses on the perceptions
of the suspect rather than on the motivations of
police.5 The new formulation has the potential for
effectively protecting an individual's right to re-
main silent by requiring police officers to avoid
topics which may evoke incriminating responses.
6
However, if courts, in applying the test, establish
a low standard of care for police making statements
in the presence of a suspect, the test has the poten-
tial for opening new avenues for police to design
subtle methods of coercing statements from sus-
pects. 7 Thus, the real impact of the Innis decision
can be ascertained only as courts apply the test in
various factual settings." The Court's conclusion
that Innis was not interrogated indicates that the
Court will hold police to a relatively low standard
of care, which will have the effect of narrowing the
scope of Miranda protections.
9
THE INNIS DECISION
On January 16, 1975, police discovered the body
of a Providence, Rhode Island, cab driver who had
been missing for several days after being dispatched
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
3 id.
4Id. at 1689-90.
5 See note 29 & accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 80-85, 108 & accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 110-11 & accompanying text infra.8 See note 112 & accompanying text infra.
9 See note 111 & accompanying text infra.
to pick up a customer. The victim apparently had
been killed by a shotgun blast fired at close range
to the back of his head. Early the next morning
another cab driver reported that he had been
robbed by a man with a sawed-off shotgun. Several
hours later, at 4:30 a.m., the police found the
defendant wandering on the street unarmed.
The arresting officer read the defendant his Mi-
randa'rights,10 but did not otherwise converse with
him. When other officers arrived on the scene, they
told the defendant of his Miranda rights two more
times, after which he asked to consult with an
attorney. The police then placed the defendant in
the squad car with three of the officers to be
transferred to the police station. The police captain
at the scene instructed the officers not to question
the defendant during the trip, and the officers
complied with his request. However, during con-
versation with his fellow officers, one officer ob-
served that there was a school nearby for handi-
capped children which would be in session in the
morning. Another officer responded that a helpless,
handicapped little girl on the way to school might
find the gun and accidentally kill herself. On hear-
ing this, the defendant told the officers to return to
the scene of the arrest so that he could lead them
to the gun. After they returned to the scene, the
officers informed the defendant of his Miranda
rights a fourth time. The defendant then directed
the officers to the shotgun.
At an evidentiary hearing before trial, the de-
fendant sought to prevent the state from admitting
the gun and his statements concerning its location.
Since he had requested an attorney, the defendant
argued that under Miranda the statements and the
shotgun were inadmissible because police obtained
them through interrogation in the absence of coun-
sel. The trial court ruled that the defendant had
'o In Miranda the Court held that "[t]he person must
be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. at 444.
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knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights and denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence." At trial, a jury convicted the
defendant of murder, kidnapping, and robbery.
12
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed the conviction.' 3 Relying on Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 4 the court held that the defendant's state-
ments were the product of a subtle form of inter-
rogation.' 5 Because the defendant had requested
an attorney after having been given his Miranda
rights, the court held that the state must meet a
heavy burden in trying to demonstrate that the
defendant had voluntarily and knowingly relin-
quished his rights before the interrogation began."
The court held that the state had failed to prove
that the defendant had waived his rights, and
therefore reversed the trial court's decision.
17
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Stewart, reversed the decision of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.'8 Initially, the
Court stated that there was no question that the
defendant was in protective custody, that he had
been adequately apprised of his rights, and that he
had asked to see a lawyer.'9 Therefore, the Court
noted that the applicability of Miranda protections
depended upon whether the conversation between




In determining whether the officers interrogated
Innis, the Court formulated a new test. 2' Although
Miranda applies only to questioning when literally
read,22 the Court recognized that its safeguards
apply to more than direct questioning." Interro-
gation also includes police techniques, such as the
"Mutt and Jeff '2 routine, which were designed to
1 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1687.12 id
"3 State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978).
14 430 U.S. 397 (1977).
"r391 A.2d at 1162-63.
16391 A.2d at 1163.
1 7391 A.2d at 1163-64.
'8 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682.
19 Id. at 1682. Miranda rights do not attach until a
suspect is placed in protective custody. Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. at 478-79. If a suspect asks to see an
attorney after receiving Miranda warnings, the police must
refrain from interrogation until an attorney is present. Id.
at 473-74.
20 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1688.
21 Id at 1689-90.
22 Id. at 1688. The Miranda court stated that warnings
must be given prior to any questioning and that if the
suspect indicates that he wants to consult with an attor-
ney, he must be allowed to do so before questioning
continues. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
2Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1688-89.
2Also referred to as the friendly/unfriendly routine,
this tactic involves one investigator who pretends to
elicit responses indirectly.ss However, the Court
warned that interrogation requires more than sim-
ply placing a defendant in custody. 26 Interrogation
is either express questioning or its functional equiv-
alent.27 More specifically, the Court held an inter-
rogation occurs when police officers knew or should
have known that their words or actions would be
likely to elicit an incriminating response.from the
defendant.s The Court emphasized that this test
of interrogation focused on the perceptions of the
suspect rather than on the intentions of the police.2
Applying this test to the case, the Court found
that the Providence police had not interrogated
Innis.a° The Court held that the officers received
no indication that would have led them reasonably
to foresee that their casual conversation would
strike a responsive chord.3' The defendant's actions
did not demonstrate that he was disoriented or
that he was extraordinarily sensitive to comments
about handicapped children. 2 In the Court's opin-
ion, the policemen's dialogue was not very lengthy
or particularly evocative.33 Therefore, the state-
ments were not the functional equivalent of ques-
tioning, because the police could not reasonably
have known that they would cause the defendant
to incriminate himself.'a The Court held that under
the facts of this case, the police had not interro-
gated the defendant.a5
Because the Court held that there was no inter-
befriend the suspect and tries to shield him from the
onslaught of the other investigator who pretends to be
mean and threatening. The friendly investigator tries to
get the suspect to confess. Other techniques cited by the
Court include those in which the police attempt to con-
vince the suspect that they have sufficient evidence to
prove the defendant's guilt, and all that is needed is
supplementary information. For example, police may set





2Id. The Court stated, "the term 'interrogation' under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." Id.
2Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90. The
Court stated, "The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
than the intent of the police." Id.





-1 Id. at 1690.
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rogation, and consequently that the evidence was
not obtained in violation of Miranda, it did not
decide whether the defendant had waived his
rights.3 6 Also, the Court expressly limited its hold-
ing to fifth amendment grounds.37 Two Justices
filed concurring opinions. Justice White briefly
stated that he preferred to reverse on the ground
that the defendant had waived his rights, but he
joined the opinion of the Court.38 Chief Justice
Burger also concurred, although he expressed con-
cern that the tension left by the majority's decision
with the Court's recent decision in Brewer would
lead to uncertainty on the part of police officers.39
Additionally, Burger feared that the new test
would require officers to determine quickly the
susceptibility and suggestability of a defendant in
circumstances which would give even a trained
psychiatrist difficulty.
4 0
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan
joined, dissented.4 ' Although these dissenters
agreed with the Court's definition of interrogation,
they felt that the Court had incorrectly applied it
to the facts of this case.42 They found it hard to
imagine a stronger appeal to the suspect's con-
science than stating that unless they found the gun
by morning, a helpless, handicapped little girl on
the way to school might find the gun and acciden-
tally kill herself.4 The police officers made these
statements in close quarters, knowing they would
be overheard. Under these circumstances, Marshall
and Brennan concluded that the policemen's con-
versation amounted to interrogation.'
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, disapproved of
the Court's definition of interrogation and with its
application to the facts.45 Stevens preferred to de-
fine interrogation broadly to include any statement
that would normally be understood by the average
listener to call for a response and any statements
which police intended to elicit a response. 6 Stevens
"Id. at 1690-91.
37 Id. at 1689 n.4.
3 Id. at 1691 (White, J., concurring).
39 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
expressed surprisingly strong support for the Miranda
decision. He stated, "The meaning of Miranda has become
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have
adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Mi-
randa, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." Id.
40Id.




45 Id. at 1693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46Id. at 1695.
felt that a test focusing on police motivations would
more effectively protect defendants' Miranda
rights.4 7 Stevens disagreed with the majority's for-
mulation because he believed that most suspects
will not incriminate themselves even under direct
questioning.' Thus, for courts applying the test in
a case involving an ordinary defendant, a question
mark at the end of the sentence makes a crucial
difference.49 Stevens predicted that the Court's test
will encourage police officers to engage in subtle




Moreover, even assuming that the Court's test
was adequate, Justice Stevens felt that the Court
was acting as a fact finder by not remanding the
case to the Rhode Island courts to apply the new
test." Based on the facts emphasized by the major-
ity, Stevens believed the Court was incorrect in
holding that the officers should not have known,
as a matter of law, that a statement would not
have elicited an incriminating response from the
defendant who was picked up at 4:30 a.m., un-
armed, and who offered no resistance."2 Appeals to
the conscience are a recognized method for eliciting
responses from a defendant. 3 Therefore, Justice
Stevens would have remanded the case, even if he
had agreed with the majority's definition of inter-
rogation.5
THE BACKGROUND OF THE INNIS DECISION
The Innis decision is one of a long line of cases
interpreting Miranda v. Arizona.ss The Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda marked the beginning
of a new era in criminal procedure. Recognizing
the inherent coerciveness of custodial surroundings,
the Court held that no individual could realistically
be assured his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination unless police officers explained to
him that he has the right to remain silent, that he
has the right to retained or appointed counsel, and
that anything he says can be used as evidence
against him.5 Moreover, the Court held that if a
defendant indicates that he wishes to remain silent
or that he wants to talk to counsel, the police must
47 Id. at 1695-96.
48Id.
49 Id. at 1696.
50 Id.
si Id. at 1696-97.
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discontinue the interrogation. 7 A suspect can
waive these rights, but the state carries a heavy
burden of proving that the waiver was knowingly
and intelligently made.ss These rights attach when-
ever the defendant is in custodial surroundings.
5 9
In recent years, the Court has interpreted Mi-
randa narrowly although its major premises still
retain their vitality.6° For example, the Court has
constricted the applicability of Miranda by allowing
the prosecution to introduce evidence obtained in
violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes."1
The Court has also held that where a reasonable
period of time elapses, police are not precluded
from reinitiating interrogation as long as they care-
fully respect the defendant's rights. 62 Additionally,
the Court has limited the scope of Miranda protec-
tions to interrogation which occurs in coercive,
custodial environments. 63 Rhode Island v. Innis is the
7 Id.
58 id. at 475.
9 Id. at 444.
o Comment, Miranda v. Arizona & The Emerging Pattern,
12 U. RICH. L. REv. 409, 428 (1978).
61 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Harris was
the first of a series of cases allowing the use of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda on cross-examination.
The Court held that these statements should be judged
under traditional voluntariness standards. Otherwise, the
Court held, a defendant would have free license to com-
mit perjury. Id. at 225-26.
The dissent in Harris argued that the exception for
impeachment testimony would effectively take away a
defendant's choice to take the stand. Id. at 231 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
The second case in the Harris line was Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), where the defendant raped
and severely beat a 43-year-old woman. Police elicited
incriminating statements after warning the defendant of
all of his rights except the right to appointed counsel.
The Court admitted the statements for impeachment
purposes and noted Miranda was only a prophylactic rule
which was not synonymous with the fifth amendment.
The third case, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975),
was somewhat analogous to Innis. In Hass the defendant
asked for an attorney after receiving warnings, but then
proceeded to make incriminating statements before they
got back to the police station to call the attorney. The
statements were received under the impeachment excep-
tion.
62 Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In that
case one officer gave the defendant his Miranda warnings
and immediately cut off questioning when defendant
indicated that he wished to remain silent. Defendant was
then locked up for a period of time before a second officer
came in and read defendant his rights again. This time
defendant waived his rights and made incriminating
statements which were admitted by the Court.
6 Oregon v. Matthiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). In this
case the defendant went to the police station voluntarily
in response to a written request by a detective. The Court
first case in which the Court has defined interro-
gation for the purpose of determining whether a
suspect's statements have been obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda.r"
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme
Court, lower courts have defined the scope of Mi-
randa in the context of interrogationes For example,
Miranda rights cannot be violated where the suspect
volunteers statements without prompting by po-
lice.66 One court has held that Miranda proscribes
interrogation only on those topics in which the
suspect has indicated that he wishes to remain
silent.67 Police are free to interview the suspect on
other topics.s
Lower courts have also addressed the issue of
whether particular types of declarative statements
made by police constitute interrogation.69 For ex-
ample, one court held that an officer interrogated
held that Miranda protections were limited to custodial,
coercive environs similar to those of Miranda itself.
In a similar case, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341 (1976), the Court held that a friendly, relaxed con-
versation with Internal Revenue Service agents in the
defendant's own home was not a custodial interrogation
under Miranda.
6' Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1687.
6 United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836 (1973); Combs v. Wingo,
465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lewis, 425
F. Supp. 1166 (D. Conn. 1977).
66 United States v. Duffy, 479 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Miranda Court stated:
There is no requirement that police stop a person
who enters a police station and states that he wishes
to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police
to offer a confession or any other statement he desires
to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissi-
bility is not affected by our holding today.
384 U.S. at 478.67 United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730. The de-
fendant appealed his conviction for possession of an
unregistered firearm, contending that his statements were
improperly admitted into evidence under Miranda. The
defendant had indicated prior to interrogation that he
did not want to discuss the shooting. The statements were
about the rifle itself.
The court denied the defendant's contention that the
continued interrogation violated Miran'da, stating:
When a person in custody has responded to proper
police interrogation by voicing a general willingness
to talk subject only to a limited desire for silence and
his wishes not to discuss a particular subject area are
respected, nothing rooted in law or constitutional




6 United States v. Rieves, 584 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Duffy, 479 F.2d 1038; Combs v.
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a suspect when he read him a ballistics report
which inculpated the defendant.7' The court held
that the officer's statements were intended to elicit
an incriminating response in the same manner as
a direct question.7' Another court, which held that
an officer's statements were interrogation, proposed
a standard for interrogation which included police
conduct which was "expected to, or likely to, evoke
admissions." 72 The court recognized that interro-
gation arose in such a wide variety of circumstances
that more specific definition could only be made
on a case-by-case basis.73 The Innis test is almost
identical to this standard.
Although the Supreme Court had not defined
interrogation with regard to Miranda prior to Innis,
the Court did discuss interrogation in the context
of the sixth amendment in Brewer v. Williams.'4 The
facts of Brewer resemble those of Innis. Police ar-
rested the defendant in Davenport, Iowa. After
Williams was arraigned before a Davenport judge,
two detectives drove him to Des Moines for trial.
The defendant retained counsel in both Davenport
and Des Moines, but police refused to allow them
to accompany him during the trip. Police did
assure the lawyers that they would not interrogate
the defendant. The transporting officers knew that
the defendant had recently escaped from a mental
Wingo, 465 F.2d 96; United States v. Lewis, 425 F. Supp.
1166.
70 Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96. The officer read the
report immediately after the suspect had asked to see an
attorney. The court held that the subsequent statements
of the suspect were inadmissible under Miranda.
71 Id. The court stated:
The purpose of a question is to get an answer.
Anything else that has the same purpose falls in the
same category and is susceptible of the same abuses
Miranda seeks to prevent. The only possible object
of showing the ballistics report to the appellant in
this case was to break him down and elicit a confes-
sion from him.
Id. at 99 (quoting Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d
82, 86 (Ky. 1969)).
This test implicitly emphasizes the intent of police
rather than the impact of the statements of the defendant.
Although the Innis test assumes a slightly different em-
phasis, the results in this case probably would have been
the same under either test.
7 United States v. Lewis, 425 F. Supp. at 1176 (quot-
ing Santos v. Bailey, 400 F. Supp. 784, 795 (M.D. Pa.
1975)). While the suspect was in jail after being arrested
for bank robbery, a police officer who knew the suspect
initiated a conversation without advising the suspect of
his Miranda rights. The court held that this constituted
interrogation and that the statements of the suspect were
inadmissible.
73 425 F. Supp. at 1176.
74 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
institution and was deeply religious. The officers
also knew that they would be passing the area in
which they suspected that Williams had hidden
the victim's body. During the trip, they delivered
what the reviewing courts termed a "Christian
burial speech." The detective told the defendant
that it was about to begin snowing, that they would
soon be passing the area where the body was
located, and that if they waited until they got to
Des Moines the innocent child would not receive
a Christian burial. The detective told the defend-
ant not to respond immediately to his statement
but simply to think about it. As they approached
the area the defendant confessed and directed the
police to the body.
Williams was convicted of murder. 75 On appeal,
he argued that the police had continued to inter-
rogate him after he had asserted his Miranda rights
in violation of the fifth amendment and that they
interrogated him in the absence of his counsel in
violation of the sixth amendment. The Supreme
Court agreed with the latter argumet.76 Finding
that Williams had not waived his sixth amendment
right to counsel, the Court reversed the conviction.
The Court found it unnecessary to address the fifth
amendment Miranda issue.
77
In reaching the conclusion that the comments of
the detectives were interrogation, the Court failed
to posit any definition of interrogation. The Court
emphasized the fact that the detectives had de-
signed a scheme through which they deliberately
and intentionally prompted the defendant to make
incriminating statements. 78 Although it did not
specifically state the factors constituting a test of
interrogation, the Court examined the police be-
havior by focusing on the intent to evoke incrimi-
nating responses.
79
75 State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (D. Ia. 1971).
76 430 U.S. 387.77 Id. at 397-98.
78 Id. at 399-400.
7 Id. The Court stated:
There can be no serious doubt ... that Detective
Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit
information from Williams just as surely as-and
perhaps more effectively than-if he had formally
interrogated him.... [H]e purposely sought during
Williams' isolation from his lawyers to obtain as
much incriminating information as possible....
The state courts clearly proceeded upon the hy-
pothesis that Detective Leaming's 'Christian burial
speech' had been tantamount to interrogation. Both
courts recognized that Williams had been entitled to
the assistance of counsel at the time he made the
incriminating statements. Yet no such constitutional
protection would have come into play if there had
been no interrogation.
Id. at 399-400 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 71
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FORMULATION OF THE NEW TEST FOR
INTERROGATION
In Innis, the Court formulated a clear test for
interrogation under the fifth amendment which
was much more direct than its sixth amendment
test in Brewer. The Court stated:
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a per-
son in custody is subjected to either express ques-
tioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say,
the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.80
Thus, for the first time, the Court has defined
how it will determine whether police have inter-
rogated a suspect for purposes of Miranda.8 l All but
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens approved
of the majority's formulation of the test.82 The
Court noted that its test "focuses primarily on the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent
.of the police."83 Consequently, if a police officer
negligently makes a remark which a reasonable
person would expect to elicit a response, Miranda
protections would be triggered even though the
officer had no intention of obtaining an admission.
Conversely, Miranda may not protect a defendant
where police make statements pursuant to a delib-
erate design to evoke a response, so long as police
could not have reasonably expected to be success-
ful.
Under the Innis test, the defendant need not
prove that an officer intended to elicit a response.8
4
In some instances, police motivation is difficult or
impossible to determine. The new test is not con-
cerned with police motivation except insofar as it
helps to characterize the reasonable expectations of
the police.85 From a policeman's point of view the
test is objective. The nature of his statement, rather
than his state of mind, is the crux of the test.86 The
test has the potential of contributing some certainty
to the scope of Miranda as well as being more
realistic about usual police motivations. An officer
has at least some guidance in ascertaining the
80 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
"' Id. at 1688.
HnJustices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the ma-
jority opinion's test but disagreed with the Court's appli-
cation of the test to the facts of the case. See note 105 &
accompanying text infra.
s3 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690.84 Id.
85Id.
6 Id.
permissible scope of conversation with a suspect.
Rather than requiring the officer to examine his
own motivations, the test causes him to focus on
the nature of his actions and statements. An officer
using reasonable care to avoid making evocative
statements can avoid Miranda's proscriptions.
Justice Stevens formulated an alternative stan-
dard for interrogation.8 7 Under Stevens' test, "the
definition of interrogation must include any police
statement or conduct that has the same purpose or
effect as a direct question. Statements that appear
to call for a response from the suspect, as well as
those that are designed to do so, should be consid-
ered interrogation."8 8 This definition is identical to
the Court's test, except it encompasses all state-
ments which were designed to elicit a response,
even those which the police could not reasonably
expect to elicit a response. Of course, police officers
do not ordinarily design statements to elicit a
response which they feel cannot succeed in obtain-
ing that objective, so the practical difference in the
tests may be minimal.
Justice Stevens' test is similar to the vaguely
defined Brewer test for interrogation under the sixth
amendment.8 9 The Court in Brewer was clearly
influenced by the deliberate process through which
police obtained Williams' confession.90 Potentially,
therefore, interrogation may assume different
meanings, depending on whether a claim arises
under the fifth or sixth amendment. 91 Without
explaining what this difference may be, the Innis
Court held that interrogation under the sixth
amendment was not necessarily the same as inter-
rogation under Miranda.92 One commentator has
observed that sixth amendment protections do not
depend on whether the defendant is in custody or
whether his statements are compelled . The sixth
amendment requires that police deal through,
rather than around, a defendant's attorney.94 Con-
versely, fifth amendment rights apply regardless of
whether the government has initiated formal ju-
dicial proceedings.9 5 The fifth amendment right to
counsel is designed to assure that a defendant has
87 Id. at 1693 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88Id. at 1695.
89 See note 79 & accompanying text supra.
90 Id. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:
What Is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.
J. 1 (1978).
Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
n See Kamisar, supra note 91, at 63.
94Id. at 41.
" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
19801
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the right to have counsel present during interro-
gation to prevent him from involuntarily or unin-
telligently waiving his right to remain silent.9
In view of these different rationales, a suspect
may be able to demonstrate that he has been
interrogated under one amendment but not the
other. For example, if police talk with a defendant
in noncustodial surroundings, after he has been
indicted, in an attempt to elicit statements from
him in the absence of his counsel, the defendant's
sixth amendment rights have been violated, but
his fifth amendment rights do not apply. In other
situations, police may talk with a suspect in custo-
dial surroundings before any judicial proceedings
have been initiated. Only the suspect's fifth amend-
ment right would apply.
Brewer probably would have been decided the
same way under the fifth amendment using the
Innis test. The detectives obviously knew that the
speech was likely to elicit incriminating statements
from Williams. 97 However, the results may be dif-
ferent in those situations where police statements
do not constitute interrogation under the Innis test
but are made with sufficient deliberateness to con-
stitute interrogation under the sixth amendment.
Of course, any difference would be irrelevant after
the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches
where both rights apply, because police conduct
would have to satisfy both tests.9 s As a consequence,
both police and courts may focus increased atten-
tion on the point at which sixth amendment rights
become applicable if the Court's concept of inter-
rogation becomes different under the fifth and
sixth amendments in future cases. If sixth amend-
ment rights attach when formal judicial proceed-
ings commence, police may even delay the initia-
tion of proceedings to avoid application of the
Brewer test.99
APPLICATION OF THE NEW TEST
The real difficulty with the Innis decision is not
in the Court's formulation of its new test as much
as its application of the test to the facts of the case.
The majority felt that given the circumstances, the
officers could not reasonably have known that the
96 Id. at 469-70.
97 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 397.9 White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 581, 590 (1978). Professor White noted that
Brewery. Williams leaves unanswered the question of when
the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches. Brewer
only establishes that it attaches at least at the beginning
of formal adversary proceedings.
99Id.
defendant would confess upon learning that a
young child might injure herself with the hidden
gun.' ° Yet, under the Court's test, even if the
officer made the statements without any thought
toward obtaining a response from the defendant,
the statements may still constitute interrogation if
the officer should have known that his comments
were likely to elicit a response.' ° As Justice Mar-
shall argued in dissent, the officers knew that the
defendant had offered no resistance and was un-
armed. It was 4:30 a.m. Clearly the statements
were a strong appeal to the moral sensibilities of
the defendant.' °2 In the absence of any mitigating
factors, the officers should have known that the
statements were likely to elicit a response. However,
a proper application of the test requires a difficult
factual determination. Every nuance of the evi-
dence must be weighed for an informed decision.
An appellate court cannot effectively accomplish
this type of fact finding by reviewing a cold trial
transcript. As Justice Stevens argued, the Court
should have remanded the case to the Rhode Island
courts. 103
The members of the Court primarily disagreed
over this application of the test to the facts of the
case. The reservations of Justices Burger and Ste-
vens resulted from a fear of potential misapplica-
tion of the test.'I ' The majority and Justice Mar-
shall agreed on the formulation of the test, but it
led them to different factual conclusions.' °5 Chief
Justice Burger felt that the test will require a
policeman to make an on-the-spot psychiatric eval-
uation of a suspect before he even opens his
mouth."° Finally, Justice Stevens feared that the
test will stimulate a new wave of subtle techniques
for coercing defendants, since the intentions of
police are not dispositive under the new test.1
0 7
These concerns of Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Stevens appear to be grounded in a belief that
the lower courts will be unable to properly apply
the new test. However, if the test is properly applied
police officers will not have to become psychiatrists.
Courts will only require that they exercise reason-
able perceptiveness when conversing with a suspect
in custody. If an officer wants to be conservative,
he can remain silent or talk about sports or the
'oo Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
I ! Id. at 1690.
'm Id. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
:0s Id. at 1697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
0i4 Id. at 1691, 1693-96 (Burger, C.J., concurring and
Stevens, J., dissenting).
0 Id. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
07 Id. at 1695-96 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
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weather, rather than matters related to the crime.
Ideally, the test will cause officers to make a con-
scious effort to avoid any topic which may elicit an
incriminating response. Conversely, the new ver-
sions of the third degree feared by Justice Stevens,
if they are at all effective, will be likely to elicit
incriminating responses. The fact that the defend-
ant actually made an incriminating response will
always be some evidence that the statements were
likely to elicit a response. There is no reason why
a difference in punctuation at the end of a sentence
is relevant under the Court's new test. The Court
expressly stated that interrogation includes all
statements which are the functional equivalent of
direct questioning.108
The opinions of ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Stevens do demonstrate that the test is susceptible
to widely varying applications. It is based on be-
haviorial assumptions about how a normal defend-
ant will react to certain kinds of statements. Chief
Justice Burger's fears assume the average defendant
is hypersensitive while Justice Marshall fears that
he is rugged enough for relatively rough treatment.
The effectiveness of the test in balancing the com-
peting policies of Miranda will depend upon the
assumptions made in the trial court. However, the
new test is not unlike many other tests which place
a heavy burden on the trial court.
One difficulty under the new test is that where
the defendant is especially susceptible, he may have
difficulty demonstrating that the police knew or
should have known about his susceptibility. For
example, a defendant who is intoxicated at the
time of his arrest may have difficulty demonstrat-
ing that the officers should have been able to
ascertain his drunkenness. The defendant may not
know his outward appearance.
t°9
Another potential difficulty with the application
of the test may occur when police initiate a series
of conversations with a defendant with an ultimate
view toward eliciting a confession. Each individual
statement may appear relatively neutral but the
cumulative effect may be extremely evocative. For
example, a police officer may converse with a
suspect in a friendly manner in order to establish
108 Id.
109 For example, in Klamert v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 1153
(9th Cir. 1970), the suspect made incriminating state-
ments after being arrested which the court found were
volunteered. The suspect's blood contained .21 percent
alcohol after two hours in custody. The court said that
the suspect was coherent during this time. If only the
suspect and police are present during questioning, the
suspect has a distinct disadvantage in demonstrating the
circumstances surrounding the arrest and detention.
a relationship which will be conducive to eventual
cooperation. Potentially, none of the statements
would be likely to elicit a response individually.
Nonetheless, the new test has the potential to
preserve the original balance between permissible
and impermissible police conduct struck by Mi-
randa. Theoretically, if courts apply it consistently,
it will provide police officers with a clearly ascer-
tainable standard of conduct. The test may require
officers not only to refrain from attempting to elicit
responses, but also to make an affirmative effort to
avoid topics which may inadvertently elicit a re-
sponse.
The test is susceptible to a wide variety of appli-
cations. Police actions and statements which may
constitute interrogation arise in many situations.
Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the
test will reach its potential. Rather, different courts
will apply the test differently, and the resulting
uncertainty will leave the scope of Miranda protec-
tions unclear.n The real impact of the test will not
be evident until the courts apply it. The applica-
tion of the test, in turn, will depend on the behav-
ioral assumptions of the courts about the suscepti-
bility of most defendants to various statements.
The Innis decision provides fertile ground for be-
havioral research. However, the first indication
that courts will fail to apply the test properly is the
Court's decision in Innis."' The Court set the stan-
dards for police conduct so low that police have an
incentive to make suggestive comments which run
contrary to the principles of Miranda.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Innis established a new
test for determining whether police statements or
conduct amount to interrogation under Miranda.
Interrogation occurs when the police knew or
should have known that their actions were likely to
elicit incriminating statements from the defend-
ant.11 2 The test focuses on objective factors rather
than police motivation. 13 However, the real mean-
ing of the test will not be known until the lower
courts begin applying the test to varying factual
situations. 114 The behavioral assumptions which
the lower courts make will be crucial in determin-
ing the impact of the test.
DAVID M. BATES
110 Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1692 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
,I See note 101 & accompanying text supra.
12 See note 28 & accompanying text supra.
11 See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
114 See notes 100-12 & accompanying text supra.
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